DOJ Reprioritizes Corporate Enforcement with Key Policy Revisions

In a May 12, 2025 speech that signaled both a recalibration of and recommitment to prosecuting white-collar crime, Matthew R. Galeotti, the newly appointed Head of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, said that the Division is “turning a new page” and embracing an enforcement approach that aims to elevate efficiency, predictability, and fairness. The changes he outlined aim to incentivize self-reporting, narrow corporate monitorships, and refocus whistleblowers.

Mr. Galeotti recognized that law-abiding companies are key to a prosperous America and that those with well-functioning compliance programs play a unique and important role in fighting white-collar crime. Mr. Galeotti explained, however, that white-collar enforcement had come at “too high a cost” for American businesses. Businesses have been subject to costly, long-running investigations that interfered with their day-to-day operations, stymied innovation, limited prosperity, and reduced efficiency. Mr. Galeotti stated that the use of carrots and sticks had become unbalanced, with the Division being too “heavy-handed” with the stick and “stingy” with the carrot. The costs and uncertainty of investigations created a disincentive for companies to work with the Criminal Division, to the detriment of both. The goal of the changes is therefore to have the Criminal Division work with companies in a more efficient, practical, and cost-effective way.

The Division’s priorities in white-collar enforcement will now focus on the “most urgent” threats to the U.S., which Mr. Galeotti defined as: 1) fraud perpetrated against Americans; 2) the defrauding of public benefits programs and government agencies, in particular Medicare and U.S. defense infrastructure; and 3) exploitation of the country’s financial system by criminals, cartels, hostile nation states, and terrorists.  

I. Guaranteed Declinations

Mr. Galeotti stressed the importance of companies cooperating with the Department to allow the government to more readily target the most culpable actors. To that end, he directed revisions to the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) to make clearer the benefits of self-disclosure. The CEP is the principal framework governing how the Division evaluates corporate self-disclosures, cooperation, and remediation. The Division intends the revised policy to streamline expectations and offer companies greater transparency and certainty regarding the benefits available when they self-report misconduct.

Key changes include:

• Guarantees Replace Presumptions:
  The revised CEP guarantees that self-reporting companies will receive a declination of prosecution—not just a presumption against prosecution—if they fully cooperate and implement remedial measures, absent aggravating circumstances.
• Flexibility Where Aggravating Factors Exist:
  The revised policy introduces a more nuanced framework for assessing cases in which aggravating circumstances exist (e.g., involvement of high-level employees, repeat offenses, pervasive misconduct). In such cases, a declination remains possible if the company’s cooperation and remediation outweigh the severity of those aggravating circumstances.
• Recognition of Post-Investigation Disclosures:
  Companies that discover and self-disclose misconduct in good faith only after the Department has initiated an investigation (often unbeknownst to the company)—though technically not the “first in”—may still qualify for a significantly reduced resolution: a non-prosecution agreement (NPA), a 75% reduction in the criminal fine, and no monitor.
• Structured Guidance and Transparency:
  The revised CEP includes an easy-to-follow flow chart and other explanatory materials to improve predictability for companies and counsel navigating self-reporting decisions.

II. Fewer, More Focused Monitors

The Division has also announced material revisions to its monitorship policy, with the stated objective of recalibrating the use of monitors to ensure that they are narrowly tailored, cost-justified, and aligned with the goals of resolution.

Notable changes include:

• Revised Criteria for Imposing a Monitor:
  Prosecutors must now evaluate whether the anticipated benefits of a monitorship outweigh its costs, not only financially but also in terms of business disruption. Key considerations include the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the risk of recurrence, existing regulatory oversight, and the maturity and efficacy of the company’s compliance program.
• Stricter Oversight of Monitor Terms and Costs:
  The Division will impose a fee cap on any monitor’s hourly rates, require budget pre-approval for all work plans, and mandate biannual meetings between the monitor, the company, and the Division. These reforms are designed to enhance transparency and ensure that monitorships serve their remedial function without becoming unduly burdensome.
• Review of Existing Monitors:
  The Division is undertaking a retrospective review of existing monitors with the goal of narrowing their scope or terminating them where appropriate, based on the “totality of the circumstances.”

III. More Whistleblower Opportunities

The Criminal Division is also expanding the scope of its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, to align with current national enforcement priorities. The revised guidance identifies additional specific categories of misconduct for which tips may be particularly valuable and eligible for monetary awards if they result in successful asset forfeitures.

Newly-added, priority categories include:

• Criminal federal procurement and government program fraud
• Trade, tariff, and customs fraud
• Federal immigration violations
• Sanctions violations, including those involving support for foreign terrorist organizations, cartels, or transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)
• Money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and Controlled Substances Act violations

As before, to qualify for a financial award, tips must result in a forfeiture action, but the policy shift aims to channel whistleblower engagement toward conduct that poses the greatest risk to national and economic security.

Conclusion

The announced policy shifts reflect a clear intent: to incentivize timely, meaningful cooperation and to focus government resources on the threats the Division views as the most serious. The Division has stated a commitment to reward companies that step forward, invest in robust compliance frameworks, and assist in the pursuit of individual wrongdoers.

For in-house counsel and compliance professionals, the Division’s message is clear: companies can benefit by engaging with the Division; and they should reassess their internal reporting protocols, investigate potential misconduct promptly, and evaluate their preparedness to engage constructively with the government when appropriate under the new policies. Those who do so should expect a more predictable and proportional response than in years past. At the same time, companies facing issues prioritized for whistleblower awards should take this into account when managing internal investigations and disclosures.