7th EU Competition Law Conference, co-hosted by Crowell & Moring, King’s College London and the Competition Law Center at George Washington University

Introduction 

On 8 October 2026, Crowell & Moring, King's College London, and the Competition Law Center at George Washington University co-hosted the 7th EU Competition Law Conference at De Warande in Brussels. Mark Meador, Commissioner at the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), delivered the opening keynote address, followed by four panels bringing together practitioners, regulators, academics, and in-house counsel to discuss the latest developments in EU, UK, and US competition law enforcement. Among other things, the panels examined algorithmic pricing; the European Commission's (Commission) new guidelines on exclusionary abuses under Article 102 TFEU (Article 102 Guidelines); the impact of dominant positions in merger reviews; and lessons from the enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act. 

Keynote Speech – FTC Commissioner Mark Meador 

Commissioner Meador highlighted the common origins of US and European competition law enforcement and argued that today’s interconnected economies make international cooperation essential, but that increasingly divergent approaches on either side of the Atlantic risk undermining convergence and collaboration. On US enforcement, he asserted that predictability comes from consistent case-by-case application of established principles, not detailed ex ante rules for every emerging technology. Although enforcement actions involving dominant firms often take too long, accelerated timelines and case management orders can deliver relief sooner without abandoning case-by-case analysis. Intervention should address proven harm proportionately without deterring lawful conduct. He questioned whether ex ante digital regulation provides the desired clarity, timely relief, or harm-based intervention. Broad obligations and substantial fines, he argued, create uncertainty: Apple delayed the rollout of features in the EU in 2024, including Apple Intelligence and iPhone Mirroring, citing DMA interoperability requirements. With six of seven designated gatekeepers and 22 of 23 designated services American, he warned that uneven burdens could erode trust. On procedural fairness and content moderation, Meador contrasted targeted US action against proven unfair or deceptive practices with the Digital Services Act’s (DSA) broader approach. He raised concerns about lawful speech and procedural fairness, citing allegations that the Commission had allowed insufficient time to review large volumes of documents and had imposed restrictive conditions on that review. Companies, he stressed, need clear notice, defined deadlines, reasonable response periods, and even-handed enforcement. 

Looking ahead, Meador advocated cooperation grounded in evidence, proportional remedies, non-discrimination, due process, sovereignty, and comity. Collaboration between the EU and US competition law systems should be driven by convergence, even if national priorities or methods differ.  

The full speech has been published on the website of the FTC and can be found here. 

Panel 1 – The Invisible Cartel: Detecting and Prosecuting Technology-Enabled Coordination 

Panel Chair: Alison Jones (Professor of Law, King's College London). Panellists: Ilaria Fanton (Principal, Oxera Consulting); Renato Nazzini KC (Barrister, Monckton Chambers and Professor of Law, King's College London); Jason Murray (Partner, Crowell & Moring). 

Pricing algorithms can facilitate more stable coordination by improving the monitoring of rivals’ prices and the speed and credibility of retaliation. EU and UK horizontal guidelines address algorithmic pricing. The Commission identifies four scenarios: algorithmic monitoring of an existing cartel; agreement to use a common algorithm (“collusion by code”); hub-and-spoke coordination through a shared platform; and the use of independent algorithms relying on public information, which is in principle lawful. The UK posters case illustrated the risk: firms unable to coordinate frequent price changes manually achieved near-perfect alignment overnight using pricing software. On liability, EU guidance treats algorithms as firms’ agents, emphasising that pricing practices that are illegal offline remain illegal when implemented online. Personalised pricing primarily raises transparency concerns; several national authorities have secured disclosure commitments. 

In the US, litigation spans multiple sectors. The US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) first major rental-software case and divergent recent Ninth and Third Circuit decisions highlight uncertainty. Withdrawal of the FTC’s information-sharing “safety zone” guidelines in 2023 left a guidance gap, while New York and California adopted legislative responses. 

Panel 2 – Gatekeeper, Monopolist, or Dominant? Unilateral Conduct in a Complex Regulatory Landscape 

Panel Chair: Thomas De Meese (Partner, Crowell & Moring). Panellists: Damien Gerard (Prosecutor General, Belgian Competition Authority (BCA)); Geneviève Borremans (Senior Legal Counsel Competition Law, Euroclear); Liza Lovdahl-Gormsen (Senior Research Fellow, British Institute of International and Comparative Law); Andy Gavil (Senior Of Counsel, Crowell & Moring; Professor of Law at Howard University). 

The Commission’s Article 102 Guidelines seek a workable effects-based approach following the Intel cases without reverting to formalism. A dedicated section on objective justification addresses efficiencies, but companies retain the burden of proof under a sliding scale, making defences difficult in practice. In-house counsel welcomed clearer frameworks for margin squeeze, tying, and refusal to supply, as well as the reaffirmation that dominance is unlikely below a 40% market share. Uncertain boundaries may chill investment and pro-competitive conduct. The UK Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) shift towards ex ante powers has coincided with limited Chapter 2 public enforcement and increased private litigation before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. A proposed “reverse follow-on” mechanism would allow the CMA to use private liability findings to impose behavioural or structural remedies. EU and US unilateral-conduct approaches show more convergence than is often assumed, with causation, de facto tying, and efficiencies litigated on both sides. 

On AI, the panel highlighted “small tech” enforcement by national competition authorities such as the BCA against domestic gatekeepers, focusing, for example, on data portability (such as user profiles) between companies. Whether pre-emptive intervention is warranted absent established dominance or collusion remains unresolved. Existing tying and bundling frameworks are difficult to apply to digital products, although the Guidelines' principles may support approaches to de facto tying and exclusivity. 

Panel 3 – The Dealmaker's Dilemma: Navigating a New Era of Merger Scrutiny 

Panel Chair: Marieke Van Nieuwenborgh (Partner, Crowell & Moring). Panellists: Marta Janek-Jecker (Case Handler, DG Competition, Commission); Joost Vandenbossche (Principal, RBB Economics); Peter Broadhurst (Partner, Crowell & Moring); Rebecca Valentine (Partner, Crowell & Moring, formerly a Trial Attorney for the DOJ’s Antitrust Division). 

The Commission’s April 2026 Draft Merger Guidelines attracted approximately 200 responses. They codify case law and adopt a forward-looking approach encompassing innovation and resilience alongside price. The panel welcomed the “innovation shield” for small innovative companies and acceptance of dynamic efficiencies. US guidelines, issued in 2023, could address innovation more fully, but claims require supporting evidence and consistent transaction documents. Economists cautioned that demanding efficiency standards structurally disadvantage those arguments relative to theories of harm. 

In Booking/eTraveli, the General Court accepted that an increase in hotel-booking market share of 1% or less could significantly impede effective competition given Booking's existing dominance. Dominance is regaining prominence: the Draft Guidelines recognise reduced market contestability as a theory of harm where one party is dominant. Paramount/Warner Bros. illustrated divergence: the DOJ closed its investigation, while US states raised concerns over negotiating leverage and reduced output. The Commission’s conditional clearance in the EU addressed film-distribution concerns in several Member States through a structural remedy. The package reflected a trend towards structural commitments with significant behavioural measures. Both the Commission and DOJ show greater openness to behavioural remedies, which should be practicable to administer and supported by clear metrics and reporting. New thresholds, call-in powers, novel theories of harm, and proliferating foreign direct investment (FDI) and national security regimes further complicate merger review. 

Fireside Chat – From Rules to Reality: What Comes Next for Digital Markets? 

Panel Chairs: Andrew Gavil (Senior Of Counsel, Crowell & Moring; Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law); Bill Kovacic (Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School). Panellists: Lucia Bonova (Head of Unit, DG Comp, European Commission); Mike Walker (formerly CMA / Frontier Economics & University of Durham). 

The discussion compared the DMA with the UK's Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, focusing on implementation, remedies, and AI. DMA enforcement has taken longer than expected but has accelerated: cases concerning Google’s steering and self-preferencing practices resulted in fines, two Article 6 specification decisions were issued in respect of Google, and market investigations into Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure as possible gatekeepers are nearing completion. The panel described AI as the only digital sector without entrenched market power, offering a window for genuine ex ante intervention. Implementation remains difficult. Around 2,000 complaints from citizens each year reveal substantial problems, while technical complexity creates bottlenecks even for companies acting in good faith. 

UK progress is slower. Google for Google Search and Google’s and Apple’s mobile platforms received Strategic Market Status (SMS) designations, but conduct requirements were considered weak. The CMA investigated Microsoft’s business-software ecosystem yet declined cloud remedies. The panel identified insufficient political support as the principal obstacle. UK pro-competitive interventions remain unused despite their potential against entrenched power. 

On remedies, some panellists questioned the DOJ’s retreat from divestiture in the Google Search appeal, noting that the remedy outcomes imposed in years of cross-jurisdictional cases had achieved very little, if any, change. The panel noted that the DMA operates on a different logic: it is a rulebook with clear obligations that also provides for structural remedies, although the Commission has not yet reached that stage. Having observed the DMA's rule-based model, the CMA's bespoke approach, and US antitrust enforcement, it was concluded that none of the three works fundamentally well, but the DMA comes closest to success. On AI, panellists warned against “sleepwalking” into entrenched frontier AI market power and advocated a public-private initiative establishing a third frontier AI hub within the EU-UK. 

All panellists spoke in their personal capacity.  

We would like to thank Benjamin Geisel, Flavie Van Maldegem, Julie van Hevele, Elisa Paredis and Ben Calloens for their contributions to the preparation of this alert.