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Vigilance as a Virtue: Lessons To Be Learned from the Coda Development v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Case

Client Alert | 3 min read | 02.28.19

The Federal Circuit has revived a complaint to correct inventorship in another case involving the intersection of patent and trade secret law. In Coda Development v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants misappropriated trade secrets and breached a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) by seeking patent protection for Plaintiff’s inventions related to self-inflating tire (SIT) technology. The district court dismissed the case on a Rule 12(b) motion. But the Federal Circuit reversed holding that the district court improperly made underlying factual findings on the inventorship issue at the pleading stage.

As alleged, in 2008, Coda’s CEO invented SIT technology and was approached by Goodyear and others with an interest to commercialize this technology. Before meeting with Goodyear, the parties executed an NDA restricting the use of disclosed information. As alleged, two meetings followed during which Coda allegedly technical presentations, product and testing methods, and performance results. Coda also shared a functional prototype. Thereafter, according to the complaint, Defendant went silent and failed to respond to requests to restart commercial discussions. In December 2009, Defendant applied for a patent entitled “Self-Inflating Tire Assembly”. A patent issued on that application in October 2011. In 2012, Coda received an email from a former Goodyear employee: “I am retired now from Goodyear and see in the news today that they have copied your SIT. Unfortunate. I thought China companies were bad.” J.A. 59 ¶ 44.

In August 2015, Coda sued in the Northern District of Ohio demanding to substitute Coda’s CEO as inventor on the ’586 patent. Coda also identified eleven other Goodyear patents that allegedly included confidential technology invented by Coda’s CEO. The complaint also alleged trade secret misappropriation.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that for each of Coda’s claims, the complaint failed to plead enough facts supporting Coda’ conception. Plaintiffs opposed and, in their reply, Goodyear introduced a 2008 article published by Coda’s CEO that disclosed the information that Coda “now claims was secret when disclosed to Goodyear in 2009.”

The complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim based on primarily the 2008 article. The district court concluded that the complaint did not allege the necessary showing of collaboration because Goodyear stopped communicating with Coda after only two meetings. Also, the district court denied Coda’s request to amend its complaint to provide details regarding the differences between the published article and the information taken by Goodyear. Finally, the district court dismissed the trade secret misappropriation claim as time barred under Ohio’s four-year statute of limitations because the patent application had published more than four years ago.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal — finding that Coda’s complaint sets out a plausible claim to correct inventorship and for trade secret misappropriation. The Court held that the facts “allow the reasonable inference that [Coda’s CEO] conceived the invention” and that Goodyear did not. The Federal Circuit stated that under motion to dismiss rules, if a court does consider material outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment and “all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Court held that Plaintiffs should have a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent material and the district court need to reconsider these issues and allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint.

As for the trade secret claim, the Federal Circuit held that there were multiple inferences that could be drawn from the allegations such that the case should proceed past the pleadings stage. In Ohio, a trade secret claim must be brought “within 4 years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.66. Defendants’ motion to dismiss argued that if Plaintiffs were reasonably diligent, they would have discovered the alleged trade secret misappropriation by June 2011—when the application of the ’586 patent published. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that there was only one reasonable inference to be drawn against the Plaintiffs. On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that there are multiple inferences to be drawn from this factual dispute. For example, Coda could have assumed that Goodyear lost interest in the technology or that Goodyear would honor the non-disclosure agreement. Moreover, the Court stated that statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and a plaintiff generally does need to plead the lack of an affirmative defense to state a valid claim. Based on the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences, the Court remanded the case to proceed past the pleadings stage.

The case emphasizes the importance of acting diligently to protect technology, especially when trade secrets are at issue.

Insights

Client Alert | 5 min read | 12.12.25

Eleventh Circuit Hears Argument on False Claims Act Qui Tam Constitutionality

On the morning of December 12, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit heard argument in United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, et al., No. 24-13581 (11th Cir. 2025). This case concerns the constitutionality of the False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam provisions and a groundbreaking September 2024 opinion in which the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the FCA’s qui tam provisions were unconstitutional under Article II. See United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Fla. Med. Assocs., LLC, 751 F. Supp. 3d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2024). That decision, penned by District Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle, was the first success story for a legal theory that has been gaining steam ever since Justices Thomas, Barrett, and Kavanaugh indicated they would be willing to consider arguments about the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions in U.S. ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., 599 U.S. 419 (2023). In her opinion, Judge Mizelle held (1) qui tam relators are officers of the U.S. who must be appointed under the Appointments Clause; and (2) historical practice treating qui tam and similar relators as less than “officers” for constitutional purposes was not enough to save the qui tam provisions from the fundamental Article II infirmity the court identified. That ruling was appealed and, after full briefing, including by the government and a bevy of amici, the litigants stepped up to the plate this morning for oral argument....