UK Client Alert: Key Reforms Under the English Arbitration Act 2025

Introduction

On 1 August 2025, the UK’s Arbitration Act 2025 (the “Act”) came into force. It applies to arbitrations and arbitration-related court proceedings commenced on or after that date and reinforces London’s status as a leading hub for international arbitration.

That Act is not, itself, a comprehensive, stand-alone statute. Rather, it clarifies and bolsters the previous legislation, the Arbitration Act 1996 (“AA 1996”), modernising the arbitration process, and incorporating developments in international arbitration best practices since that time.

Its provisions include: a new statutory rule for the law governing arbitration agreements, streamlined procedures for challenging tribunal jurisdiction, express powers for summary disposal (which should hopefully lead to the more efficient resolution of disputes), and enhanced protections for arbitrators. In the following sections, we summarise the key reforms and explain their practical implications for stakeholders engaging in arbitration under English law.

Reforms to the English Arbitration Act 1996

Key Legislative Changes

The Act introduces a range of notable amendments, including:

Default Law of the Arbitration Agreement: A new statutory rule provides that, unless the parties expressly agree otherwise, the law governing the arbitration agreement will be that of the seat of arbitration, rather than the law of the underlying contract. This approach overturns the Supreme Court decision in Enka v Chubb, which prioritised the governing law of the contract. It held that where parties had chosen a law to govern the underlying contract, this law would generally also apply to the arbitration agreement. In the absence of such a choice, the law of the seat would generally apply. The practical effect of that decision was uncertainty and the likelihood that parties to a foreign law contract with a London-seated arbitration agreement might not benefit from key provisions of the AA 1996. The Act reduces uncertainty and minimises the risk of unhelpful satellite issues.

Streamlined Challenges to Jurisdiction: The Act clarifies and limits the grounds and evidence that can be introduced in court challenges to a tribunal’s jurisdiction, aiming to avoid rehearings and promote efficiency. For example, a party cannot raise before the court an objection to the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction, unless that objection was also raised before the tribunal itself. Nor can a party seek to rely on evidence before the court unless the same evidence was put before the tribunal. The Court can disregard these restrictions “in the interests of justice”, but this power is likely to be exercised sparingly.

The Act also confirms that, where a tribunal finds it has no jurisdiction, it can still make an award of costs.

Summary Disposal: The Act confirms that tribunals are expressly empowered to summarily dispose of claims, defences, or issues with “no real prospect of succeeding” provided all parties have a reasonable opportunity to make representations. Parties may opt out of this procedure by agreement. This reflects the wording of the threshold for summary judgment in English litigation. Tribunals likely already had this power but (perhaps because of the uncertainty around that question) often seemed reluctant to use it. Active judicial case management is a feature of litigation in the English High Court. In contrast, arbitrations are too often marked by a laissez-faire approach in which the running of hopeless arguments may – or may not – be sanctioned in the final costs award. The authors hope that this change gives tribunals comfort to use their powers to narrow issues as early as possible in proceedings and thereby reduce costs.

Emergency Arbitrators: The Act formally recognises emergency arbitrators (an innovation that came after the AA 1996, hence its silence on the issue), granting them powers to issue peremptory orders and to permit applications to court for urgent relief, aligning statutory law with institutional rules such as those of the London Court of International Arbitration.

Codification of Arbitrators’ duty to make disclosures: Arbitrators now have a statutory duty to disclose any circumstances that might reasonably, from the perspective of the parties, give rise to doubts about their impartiality. This duty extends to both actual knowledge and to what parties reasonably ought to know. The statute thus codifies the current common law duty.

Extending protections for Arbitrators: Arbitrator immunity has been strengthened, limiting liability for resignation and for costs of removal applications unless bad faith or unreasonableness is proven.

Court Powers: The Act clarifies that court powers to support arbitration (such as taking evidence of witnesses, preserving evidence, or ordering the sale of goods subject to the proceedings) extend to third parties.

Conclusion

The Arbitration Act 2025 is a meaningful step forward in the evolution of English arbitration law, introducing targeted reforms that resolve unnecessary uncertaintiies and modernise the statutory framework for both domestic and international users. By clarifying the default law governing arbitration agreements, streamlining jurisdictional challenges, empowering tribunals with express summary disposal powers, and bolstering both the duties owed by, and the protections afforded to, arbitrators, the Act enhances the efficiency, predictability, and integrity of arbitration proceedings. The recognition of emergency arbitrators and expanded court support further align English law with global best practices, reinforcing London’s reputation as a premier arbitration seat.

As the new provisions are now in force, parties and practitioners should carefully review their current arbitration clauses and procedural strategies to ensure they benefit from the updated regime.

We would like to thank Harvey Hill for his contribution to this alert.