Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Sixth Circuit’s “Background Circumstances” Requirement For “Reverse Discrimination” Cases
Client Alert | 2 min read | 06.06.25
On Thursday, June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, rejecting the "background circumstances" rule that would require majority-group plaintiffs to meet a heightened evidentiary standard in Title VII discrimination cases. The decision vacated and remanded the case for further consideration by the Sixth Circuit. In so doing, the Court held that all plaintiffs – whether minority or majority employees – bringing discrimination cases under Title VII are subject to the same evidentiary standards under the McDonnell Douglas framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims.
In this case, Plaintiff Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, had been employed by the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. She applied for a management position but was passed over in favor of another candidate – a lesbian woman – and later demoted from her role and replaced by a gay man. She sued under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit analyzed Ames’s claims under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework and found that Ames had failed to meet her prima facie burden because she had not shown “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make this showing “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima facie case.” Notably, Judge Kethledge concurred in the decision but wrote separately to express his disagreement with the “background circumstances” rule. In his view, the requirement was not only unworkable—in that it required an assessment of evidence presented by different plaintiffs under different standards—but also diverged substantially from Title VII’s text.
The Supreme Court's opinion, penned by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, makes clear that Title VII does not impose a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs. The Court rejected the "background circumstances" rule as inconsistent with Title VII's text and precedent, and emphasized the need for equal application of Title VII to all individuals, regardless of majority or minority status, reasoning that the text of Title VII does not distinguish between majority and minority plaintiffs.
Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch, which critiqued “judge-made” doctrines, including both the "background circumstances" rule and the McDonnell Douglas framework itself. He wrote, “the McDonnell Douglas framework lacks any basis in the text of Title VII and has proved difficult for courts to apply. In a case where the parties ask us to do so, I would be willing to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is a workable and useful evidentiary tool.”
This decision resolves a circuit split on this issue and may encourage “majority group” litigants to more boldly pursue discrimination claims, particularly against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s efforts to move employers away from diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives.
Insights
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