Presumption of Patent Validity Does Not Necessarily Extend to Entitlement to an Earlier Filing Date
Client Alert | 1 min read | 04.11.08
In Poweroasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (No. 2007-1265; April 11, 2008), a Federal Circuit panel agrees with a district court's conclusion that the asserted patent claims directed to vending machines that sell telecommunications access were not entitled to the benefit of the original application's filing date because the original application did not provide a written description of the now-claimed invention. The grant of summary judgment of invalidity with respect to all the claims of the two asserted patents stemming from a chain of continuation and continuation-in-part applications based on anticipation under section 102 (b) is thus affirmed. The intervening prior art that gives rise to a public use, sale or offer for sale is the MobileStar Network, a high-speed wireless data network that connected users to the Internet that was conceded to contain all of the same features that the accused T-Mobile HotSpot Network contains.
Notwithstanding the statutory presumption that a patent is valid, the panel agrees with the lower court's conclusion that the patentee here had the burden of proving that it was entitled to the priority of the original application when the Patent and Trademark Office had not previously addressed the issue. In distinguishing its 1985 Ralston Purina decision, the panel observes that in this case there was no interference or any other determination of priority during prosecution incident to a rejection, in the absence of which the Office does not make such findings "as a matter of course in prosecution." Citing to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures, the panel notes that the Office's own procedures indicate that examiners do not make such priority determinations except where necessary. Thus, the court concludes, "there is simply no reason to presume that claims in a CIP application are entitled to the effective date of an earlier filed application."
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Client Alert | 4 min read | 08.07.25
On July 25, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in United States ex. rel. Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage Inc. et al., holding that a district court cannot ignore new factual allegations included in an amended complaint filed by a False Claims Act qui tam relator based on the fact that those additional facts were learned in discovery, even while a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) is pending. Under Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud typically must include factual support showing the who, what, where, why, and how of the fraud to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss. And while that standard has not changed, Sedona gives room for a relator to file first and seek out discovery in order to amend an otherwise deficient complaint and survive a motion to dismiss, at least in the Eleventh Circuit. Importantly, however, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that a district court retains the discretion to dismiss a relator’s complaint before or after discovery has begun, meaning that district courts are not required to permit discovery at the pleading stage. Nevertheless, the Sedona decision is an about-face from precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, and many other circuits, where, historically, facts learned during discovery could not be used to circumvent Rule 9(b) by bolstering a relator’s factual allegations while a motion to dismiss was pending. While the long-term effects of the decision remain to be seen, in the short term the decision may encourage relators to engage in early discovery in hopes of learning facts that they can use to survive otherwise meritorious motions to dismiss.
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