GSA Clarifies Permissibility of Upfront Payments for Software-as-a-Service Offerings
Client Alert | 1 min read | 04.18.24
On March 15, 2024, the General Services Administration (GSA) issued Acquisition Letter MV-2024-01 providing guidance to GSA contracting officers on the use of upfront payments for acquisitions of cloud-based Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Specifically, this acquisition letter clarifies that despite statutory prohibitions against the use of “advance” payments outside of narrowly-prescribed circumstances, upfront payments for SaaS licenses do not constitute an “advance” payment subject to these restrictions when made under the following conditions:
- access to the software is granted contemporaneously with payment (i.e., delivery of the license is made contemporaneously with payment);
- the license is acquired under a fixed-price or fixed-price with economic price adjustment, even if other portions of the task order or contract are not fixed price;
- the license is priced at a single seat, multi-seat, unit, or subscription price covering a fixed term, defined as “a limited period of time”;
- the license’s pricing/billing model allows for no utilization or consumption metric other than quantity to affect the costs incurred over the negotiated term;
- the license does not require any upfront payment other than the fixed seat, unit, or subscription cost as a prerequisite for access or a pricing discount; and
- within end user or other license agreements, the licensed service is continuous and uninterrupted for the negotiated term of access to the license.
This guidance follows Acquisition Letter MV-21-06, which permitted federal agencies to order cloud computing services on a consumption basis through GSA’s Federal Supply Schedule program (and eliminated application of the Price Reductions Clause to such offerings), and it represents the latest in a series of steps by GSA to better align the federal government’s acquisition practices for information services with customary commercial practices.
Insights
Client Alert | 4 min read | 08.07.25
On July 25, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in United States ex. rel. Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage Inc. et al., holding that a district court cannot ignore new factual allegations included in an amended complaint filed by a False Claims Act qui tam relator based on the fact that those additional facts were learned in discovery, even while a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) is pending. Under Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud typically must include factual support showing the who, what, where, why, and how of the fraud to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss. And while that standard has not changed, Sedona gives room for a relator to file first and seek out discovery in order to amend an otherwise deficient complaint and survive a motion to dismiss, at least in the Eleventh Circuit. Importantly, however, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that a district court retains the discretion to dismiss a relator’s complaint before or after discovery has begun, meaning that district courts are not required to permit discovery at the pleading stage. Nevertheless, the Sedona decision is an about-face from precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, and many other circuits, where, historically, facts learned during discovery could not be used to circumvent Rule 9(b) by bolstering a relator’s factual allegations while a motion to dismiss was pending. While the long-term effects of the decision remain to be seen, in the short term the decision may encourage relators to engage in early discovery in hopes of learning facts that they can use to survive otherwise meritorious motions to dismiss.
Client Alert | 4 min read | 08.06.25
FinCEN Delays Implementation Date and Reopens AML/CFT Rule for Investment Advisers
Client Alert | 4 min read | 08.06.25
Series of Major Data Breaches Targeting the Insurance Industry
Client Alert | 11 min read | 08.06.25