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Different Burden Of Proof For Relief From Judgment For Newly Discovered Evidence And For Fraud

Client Alert | 1 min read | 08.15.06

In Venture Industries Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., (No. 05-1537; August 7, 2006), the Federal Circuit affirms in part, vacates in part and remands the district court's denial of Autoliv's request for relief from judgment. Venture filed suit against Autoliv for breach of a supply agreement and several patent-based claims. Venture's damages expert at trial relied upon financial information from its Grand Blanc manufacturing facility. A jury found that Autoliv breached the supply agreement and awarded Venture damages. Subsequent to final judgment, a forensic accounting firm found that the Grand Blanc facility had questionable accounting procedures, and lacked proper accounting controls along with potential accounting irregularities and errors.

In view of the damages expert's testimony that he did not rely upon the faulty data identified by the forensic accounting firm, the district court's holding that Autoliv did not satisfy its burden of proof that the forensic accounting firm's findings, which was newly discovered evidence, would have altered the jury's decision is affirmed. In the Sixth Circuit, whose law governs this issue, prejudice is presumed when a party proves by clear and convincing evidence that the non-moving party's behavior constituted fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct, and the non-moving party must show that the misbehavior did not have a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the litigation. Since the district court did not address the possibility of prejudice of the damages expert's testimony, its denial of relief from judgment for fraud is vacated.

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Client Alert | 3 min read | 06.12.26

DOJ Guidance Backs Away From Disparate Impact Liability

On June 9, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a formal opinion concluding that the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission’s (EEOC) existing interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) disparate-impact liability, including the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (UGESP), are unconstitutional. According to the opinion, EEOC’s prior interpretations contemplate liability based on disproportionately adverse effects alone, without regard to an employer’s likely intent, rather than treating disparate impact as an evidentiary mechanism to “smoke out” intentional discrimination. DOJ found that this approach functions as a “qualified racial-proportionality mandate” that places “a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.” The opinion fulfills one mandate of Executive Order 14281, which rejected disparate-impact liability insofar as it “creates a near insurmountable presumption that unlawful discrimination exists wherever there are any differences in outcomes among different [demographic groups].”...