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Claims Filed After Critical Date To Provoke Interference Are Barred Unless They Are Not Materially Different From Claims Filed Before Critical Date

Client Alert | 1 min read | 07.19.06

In Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Univ. of Iowa Research Found. (No. 05-1374; July 17, 2006), the Federal Circuit affirms a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) that the University of California (“California”) failed to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1) (which states that an applicant cannot file “[a] claim which is the same as, or for the same or substantially the same subject matter as, a claim of an issued patent . . . unless such a claim is made prior to one year from the date on which the patent was granted”). In the application involved in the interference, California had filed a set of claims within one year of the issuance of the University of Iowa's patent, which were then cancelled in light of an new claim filed after the one-year period had expired. The Board found that California failed to comply with Section 135(b)(1), as its new claim was materially different than its earlier-filed claims. On appeal, California argued that only its earlier-filed claims must meet the 135(b)(1) test. The Federal Circuit, however, affirms the Board's decision and states that, “a party confronted with a section 135(b)(1) bar” can avoid the bar if it can “show that claims filed after the critical date find support in claims filed before the critical date.”

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Client Alert | 3 min read | 06.12.26

DOJ Guidance Backs Away From Disparate Impact Liability

On June 9, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a formal opinion concluding that the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission’s (EEOC) existing interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) disparate-impact liability, including the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (UGESP), are unconstitutional. According to the opinion, EEOC’s prior interpretations contemplate liability based on disproportionately adverse effects alone, without regard to an employer’s likely intent, rather than treating disparate impact as an evidentiary mechanism to “smoke out” intentional discrimination. DOJ found that this approach functions as a “qualified racial-proportionality mandate” that places “a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.” The opinion fulfills one mandate of Executive Order 14281, which rejected disparate-impact liability insofar as it “creates a near insurmountable presumption that unlawful discrimination exists wherever there are any differences in outcomes among different [demographic groups].”...