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Subcontractor Must Intend That Government Pay False Claim Submitted To Prime, Supreme Court Rules

Client Alert | 1 min read | 06.10.08

The Supreme Court's unanimous decision this week in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders (June 9, 2008, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-214.pdf), interprets section 3729(a)(2) of the federal civil False Claims Act (imposing treble damages and penalties on anyone who "knowingly makes [or] uses … a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid by the Government") in a way likely to increase the difficulty of pursuing FCA allegations against government subcontractors such as those in this case, who allegedly submitted false certificates of conformance to the primes and higher-tier subs under Navy shipbuilding contracts. The Court stated, (1) that 3729(a)(2) includes an intent requirement, i.e., the plaintiff must prove that the subcontractor defendant intended that the government pay a false claim in reliance on the sub's false statements to the prime, and (2) that although section (a)(2), unlike section (a)(1), does not require proof that the defendant "presented" a false claim to the government, (3) it still is not sufficient under (a)(2) simply to prove that a sub's false statement "resulted in the use of Government funds to pay a false or fraudulent claim," because if that were so, "almost boundless" FCA liability could attach to any fraud against a private party as long as the victim had received some federal funds.

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Client Alert | 2 min read | 11.14.25

Defining Claim Terms by Implication: Lexicography Lessons from Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corporation

Claim construction is a key stage of most patent litigations, where the court must decide the meaning of any disputed terms in the patent claims.  Generally, claim terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning except under two circumstances: (1) when the patentee acts as its own lexicographer and sets out a definition for the term; and (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the term either in the specification or during prosecution.  Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp. highlights that patentees can act as their own lexicographers through consistent, interchangeable usage of terms across the specification, effectively defining terms by implication....