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In First State High Court Ruling, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Finds No Coverage for COVID-19 Business Interruption Losses

Client Alert | 3 min read | 04.25.22

On April 21, 2022, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the highest appellate court in Massachusetts, affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff restaurant operators’ COVID-19 business interruption claim in Verveine Corp., et al. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., et al. The Court held that COVID-19 related losses are not covered by a property policy that requires “direct physical loss of or damage to” property because “direct physical loss of or damage to” property “requires some ‘distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration of the property.’” Opinion at 15.

In evaluating whether there was any “direct physical loss of or damage to property” at the restaurants, the court found there was no reasonable interpretation of that policy language that could support the plaintiffs’ claims for business interruption coverage. Id. at 13. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that coverage was available because the coronavirus was physical and had physical effects, noting that “the question is not whether the virus is physical, but rather if it has direct physical effect on property that can be fairly characterized as ‘loss or damage.’” Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). Significantly, the court noted that every appellate court that has reviewed COVID-19 insurance claims has agreed with its interpretation. Id. at 15. The court concluded that its interpretation of the policy was bolstered by the definition of “period of restoration,” which provides that coverage ends on the date when the property could be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality or the date when business is resumed at a new permanent location, which, the court found, “clearly implies that the property has not experienced physical loss or damage in the first place unless there needs to be active repair or remediation measures to correct the claimed damage or the business must move to a new location.” Id. at 16.

In applying the phrase “direct physical loss of or damage,” the court concluded that the allegations did not trigger coverage under the policy because the suspension of business at the restaurants was “not in any way attributable to a direct physical loss or damage,” as there were no physical effects on the property, as demonstrated by the restaurants’ continuing ability to operate by providing takeout and other services. Id. at 17. According to the court, COVID-19 closure orders do not constitute direct physical loss or damage to property, id., and the mere presence of the virus on the surfaces and in the air at the restaurants “does not amount to loss or damage to the property.” Specifically, the court reasoned, the “[e]vanescent presence of a harmful airborne substance that will quickly dissipate on its own, or surface-level contamination that can be removed by simple cleaning, does not physically alter or affect property.” Id. at 18.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the difference between “loss” and “damage” must mean that “loss” has a different scope of coverage that does not rely on physical alteration of property. That contention, the court explained, “ignores that the loss itself must be a ‘direct physical’ loss, clearly requiring a direct, physical deprivation of possession.” Id. at 20. And the court also rejected the argument that the existence of a virus exclusion in some policies creates a negative implication that policies without a virus exclusion should cover claims arising from the COVID-19 virus. “[N]o such negative implication can or should be drawn.” Id. at 21-22. Rather, the court found that its interpretation of “direct physical loss of or damage to property” does not render a virus exclusion meaningless, as it would have independent significance “where, for example, personal property, such as food, becomes physically contaminated or infected with a virus, requiring its destruction or some form of remediation.” Id. at 22.

Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim for civil authority coverage was also correctly dismissed because the COVID-19 virus did not cause “damage” to properties within one mile of the restaurants for the same reasons that the presence of the virus did not cause damage to property under the business interruption coverage provision. Id. at 24.

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Client Alert | 4 min read | 08.07.25

File First, Facts Later? Eleventh Circuit Says That Discovery Can Inform False Claims Act Allegations in Amended Complaints

On July 25, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in United States ex. rel. Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage Inc. et al., holding that a district court cannot ignore new factual allegations included in an amended complaint filed by a False Claims Act qui tam relator based on the fact that those additional facts were learned in discovery, even while a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) is pending.  Under Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud typically must include factual support showing the who, what, where, why, and how of the fraud to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  And while that standard has not changed, Sedona gives room for a relator to file first and seek out discovery in order to amend an otherwise deficient complaint and survive a motion to dismiss, at least in the Eleventh Circuit.  Importantly, however, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that a district court retains the discretion to dismiss a relator’s complaint before or after discovery has begun, meaning that district courts are not required to permit discovery at the pleading stage.  Nevertheless, the Sedona decision is an about-face from precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, and many other circuits, where, historically, facts learned during discovery could not be used to circumvent Rule 9(b) by bolstering a relator’s factual allegations while a motion to dismiss was pending.  While the long-term effects of the decision remain to be seen, in the short term the decision may encourage relators to engage in early discovery in hopes of learning facts that they can use to survive otherwise meritorious motions to dismiss....