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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

DO SUNG UHM AND EUN SOOK UHM, a  
married couple, individually, and for all others  
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HUMANA, INC., a Delaware corporation,  
HUMANA MEDICAL PLAN, INC., a  
Florida corporation, HUMANA HEALTH  
PLAN, INC., a Kentucky corporation, all  
d/b/a Humana,

Defendants.

CASE NO. C06-0185-RSM

ORDER GRANTING  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION  
TO DISMISS FOR  
FAILURE TO STATE A  
CLAIM

This matter comes before the Court on defendant Humana Health Plan, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Dkt. # 9-1). Remaining defendant Humana, Inc. has joined in the motion to dismiss.<sup>1</sup> (Dkt. #24). Oral argument was held on May 26, 2006, and the matter has been fully considered. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion shall be

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<sup>1</sup>On April 18, 2006, plaintiffs filed an objection to Humana, Inc.'s joinder in Humana Health Plan's motion to dismiss. (Dkt. #25). However, the same legal arguments apply to Humana, Inc. and Humana Health Plan, Inc. in this case, and the Court finds that Humana Inc.'s joinder in the motion to dismiss is proper.

1 granted.

2 In this action, plaintiff brought various state-law claims against defendants, who are  
3 sponsors of a Medicare Part D (“Part D” or “Drug Benefit”) prescription drug plan (“PDP”).  
4 Defendants argue that the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of  
5 2003 (“MMA”) (Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42  
6 U.S.C)), expressly preempts state law with respect to any aspect of the Drug Benefit for which  
7 there are federal standards. Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by federal  
8 law because there are federal standards which govern the subject matter of each of plaintiffs’  
9 claims. Defendants further argue that plaintiffs may not seek judicial review of their claims until  
10 they have exhausted the MMA-established administrative remedies for coverage determinations  
11 and other grievances.

12 Plaintiffs respond that Congress did not intend for the MMA’s express preemption  
13 language to preempt state tort and contract claims. Plaintiffs further argue that their claims do  
14 not “arise under” the Medicare Act, and that the claims are not preempted, according to the rule  
15 set out in *Heckler v. Ringer*, 466 U.S. 602, 615 (1984). Plaintiffs also argue that the doctrine of  
16 exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable to plaintiffs because they do not seek a  
17 coverage determination and because the grievance procedure for non-coverage-determination  
18 grievances would be futile.

19  
20 DISCUSSION

21 A. Background

22 Plaintiffs are senior citizens who wished to enroll in the new Medicare Part D prescription  
23 drug benefit program created by the MMA. (Dkt. #1-1 at 2). The Drug Benefit is administered  
24 by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), a federal agency. (Dkt. #9-1 at  
25 4).

26 Plaintiffs allege that they chose defendant Humana’s prescription drug plan (“PDP”) from

1 among many PDP options. (Dkt. #1-1 at 7). In choosing defendants' plan, plaintiffs relied on  
2 defendants' advertising materials. (Dkt. #1-1 at 8). Plaintiffs then completed the Humana PDP  
3 enrollment form. (Dkt. #1-1 at 7). Defendants represented to plaintiffs that they would receive  
4 the Drug Benefit beginning on January 1, 2006. (Dkt. #1-1 at 7). Defendants began charging  
5 plaintiffs a monthly premium in January, 2006. (Dkt. #1-1 at 4). Defendants' PDP required that  
6 enrollees use a mail-order form to obtain their prescription drugs. (Dkt. #1-1 at 9). Between  
7 mid-December and early February 2006, plaintiffs made numerous requests for Drug Benefit  
8 order forms and instructions, but defendants failed to provide them to plaintiffs. (Dkt. #1-1 at 9-  
9 10). Plaintiffs were forced to purchase their prescription drugs out-of-pocket at retail prices.  
10 (Dkt. #1-1 at 10).

11 Plaintiffs commenced this action on February 2, 2006. (Dkt. #1-1 at 1). They claim  
12 breach of contract, violation of state consumer protection statutes, unjust enrichment, fraud, and  
13 fraud in the inducement. (Dkt. #1-1 at 14-17). Plaintiffs purport to bring this action as a class  
14 action under F.R.C.P. 23. (Dkt. #1-1 at 11-13).

15 Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to F.R.C.P.  
16 12(b)(6).

17 B. Motion to Dismiss Standard

18 In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which  
19 relief may be granted, the Court must (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to  
20 plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether the  
21 plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. *See, Cahill v.*  
22 *Liberty Mutual Insurance Company*, 80 F. 3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

23 C. Preemption

24 Defendants argue that the MMA expressly preempts plaintiffs' state law claims. When  
25 interpreting an express preemption clause, the Court first focuses on the plain meaning of the  
26 statutory language, which provides the best evidence of congressional intent. *CSX Transp., Inc.*

1 *v. Easterwood*, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). The relevant statutory language is found in 42  
2 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (2006), which provides:

3           The standards established under this part shall supersede any state law or  
4           regulation (other than State licencing laws or State laws relating to plan  
5           solvency) with respect to [Medicare Part C managed care] plans which are  
6           offered by [Medicare managed care] organizations under this part.

7 The clause applies to Medicare Part D Drug Benefit providers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-  
8 112(g) (2006). The language of the MMA preemption clause is clear: if Part D establishes  
9 standards that cover plaintiffs' claims, then those standards supersede state law, and plaintiffs'  
10 state law claims are preempted.<sup>2</sup>

11           Defendants argue that the regulations for "approval of marketing materials and enrollment  
12 forms" preempt plaintiffs' claims insofar as they relate to defendants' marketing materials. *See*  
13 42 C.F.R. § 423.50 (2005). The regulations establish comprehensive standards for marketing  
14 materials, and they provide for a mandatory CMS approval process before those marketing  
15 materials can be used. *Id.* Included in the regulations are provisions prohibiting marketing  
16 materials that "could mislead or confuse Medicare beneficiaries, or misrepresent the Part D  
17 sponsor or its Part D plan." § 423.50(f)(iv). There are clearly standards established under  
18 Medicare Part D statute with respect to marketing materials, and those standards supersede  
19 state law pursuant to the express preemption language of Part D. Thus, plaintiffs' consumer  
20 protection claims are preempted, and their fraud and fraud in the inducement claims are  
21 preempted to the extent that they rely on defendants' marketing materials.

22           Defendants further argue that plaintiffs seek a "coverage determination" and that their

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23           <sup>2</sup>Plaintiffs argue that their claims do not "arise under" the Medicare Act and are therefore not preempted  
24 by federal standards pursuant to the rule in *Heckler v. Ringer*. However, the *Heckler* standard does not apply  
25 here. In that case, the court interpreted a section of the Medicare Act which made judicial review possible only  
26 after the exhaustion of the procedure provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)-(h). *Heckler*, 466 U.S. at 605. The  
provision in question in *Heckler* actually contains the language "arise under," while the provision in question  
here has no such language. *Id.* at 615. Additionally, the *Heckler* decision informs remedy exhaustion analysis,  
and not preemption analysis.

1 claims are therefore governed exclusively by the coverage determinations process set out in 24  
2 C.F.R. § 423.562 et seq. According to § 423.566, a coverage determination is: 1) a decision  
3 not to provide or pay for a Part D drug; 2) failure to provide a coverage determination in a  
4 timely manner; 3) a decision concerning an exceptions requests under two different sections of  
5 the part; 4) a decision about the amount of cost sharing for a drug. 42 C.F.R. § 423.566(b)  
6 (2005).

7 Plaintiffs argue that they do not seek – or seek to appeal – a “coverage determination.”  
8 They argue that they do not claim that defendants have made an incorrect decision about  
9 whether to pay for a certain drug, nor do they complain of any of the other conduct listed in the  
10 “coverage determination” definition. Instead, they claim that they were outside the system  
11 entirely because they did not have access to the order forms and instructions by which they  
12 could order prescription drugs. Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claim is, at bottom, one  
13 about failure to provide coverage. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants breached their  
14 contract when defendants “failed to provide prescription drug benefits as promised,” and that  
15 defendants were unjustly enriched because defendants charged premiums but failed to provide  
16 drug benefits.

17 The Court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs’ claims fall within the ambit of the  
18 coverage determination procedures and appeals process outlined in 24 C.F.R. § 423.562 et seq.  
19 Accordingly, the coverage determination regulations promulgated under Part D supersede  
20 plaintiffs’ state contract and unjust enrichment claims, and their fraud claims to the extent that  
21 those stem from a failure to provide benefits as promised.

22 Even if plaintiffs were not seeking a coverage determination, their claims would  
23 nonetheless be preempted by other Part D standards. In addition to “coverage determination”  
24 appeals procedures, Part D also establishes grievance procedures. 42 C.F.R. § 423.564 (2005).  
25 The grievance procedures apply to any non-coverage-determination dispute between a PDP  
26 sponsor and its enrollees about any operations, activities, or behavior of the PDP sponsor. *See*

1 42 C.F.R. §§ 423.560, 423.564 (2005). The regulations require that a PDP sponsor provide  
2 “meaningful procedures for timely hearing and resolving grievances,” subject to certain  
3 standards outlined by CMS. 42 C.F.R. § 423.564(a), (e)-(g). These grievance procedures cover  
4 plaintiffs’ complaint that defendants failed to provide drug order forms and instructions. As a  
5 result, plaintiff’s contract and unjust enrichment claims, and their fraud claims to the extent that  
6 they relate to promises to provide forms and instructions, are preempted by the federally  
7 established grievance procedures.

8 Plaintiffs argue that preemption by grievance procedures leads to the “absurd” result of  
9 making PDP sponsors the “sole and final judges of any claims brought against them.” However,  
10 grievances, even when adjudicated by insurance companies themselves, are not entirely  
11 inconsequential. PDP sponsors must maintain records of all grievances and their dispositions,  
12 and they must report all grievances to CMS. 42 C.F.R. § 423.564(g); Medicare Part D  
13 Reporting Requirements, CMS, Jan. 25, 2006. CMS then has the authority to impose  
14 “intermediate sanctions,” including fines of up to \$100,000, on PDP sponsors for violations  
15 including misrepresentation and failure to provide medically necessary items. 42 C.F.R. §§  
16 423.750, 423.752 (2005).

17 Plaintiffs also argue that CMS’s commentary indicates that Congress did not intend to  
18 preempt state contract and tort remedies. Specifically, plaintiffs cite CMS’s opinion that  
19 Congress did not intend to preempt state claims for torts such as wrongful death. 70 Fed. Reg.  
20 4362 (Jan. 28, 2005). CMS goes on to say that Congress did not intend to preempt state  
21 contract law with respect to disputes between plans and their *subcontractors*. *Id.* In short,  
22 CMS believes that “an enrollee will still have state remedies available in cases in which the legal  
23 issue before the court is independent of an issue related to the organization’s status” as a PDP  
24 sponsor. *Id.* Defendants point out, however, that this action is entirely derived from  
25 defendants’ provision of a Part D drug benefit, and not from its other activities as a private  
26 insurer. (Dkt. #27 at 5). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims are related to the organization’s

1 status as a PDP sponsor, and Congress intended to preempt them.

2 Furthermore, the legislative history of the preemption provision makes it clear that  
3 Congress intended Part D preemption to be broad in scope. Prior to the MMA, state laws were  
4 preempted wherever they were “inconsistent” with federal standards, or when they related to  
5 one of four specified categories. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (2002). The MMA, in contrast,  
6 provided that federal standards shall supersede all state laws and regulations with respect to  
7 PDP plans, except for standards relating to licensure and solvency. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-  
8 26(b)(3), 1395w-112(g) (2006). As CMS explains this change: “[t]he [old] presumption was  
9 that a state law was not preempted if it did not conflict with a [Medicare managed care]  
10 requirement and did not fall into one of the four categories where preemption was presumed . . .  
11 [T]he MMA reversed this presumption and provided that state laws are *presumed to be*  
12 *preempted* unless they relate to licensure or solvency.” 70 Fed. Reg. 4319 (emphasis added).

13 Additionally, however harsh preemption may seem to particular claimants, it is consistent  
14 with the structure and purpose of the MMA. In discerning the precise scope of express  
15 preemption, the Court may look to the statutory framework and the structure and purposes of  
16 the statute as a whole. *Medtronic v. Lohr*, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996). The Medicare statutes  
17 and regulations create an exceedingly complex national program which requires administration  
18 by agencies with expertise in the area. As CMS has noted when discussing the preemption  
19 provision with respect to the Medicare managed care program, “Congress intended that the . . .  
20 program, a Federal program, operate under Federal rules.” 69 Fed. Reg. 49604 (Aug. 3, 2004).  
21 Furthermore, CMS expressed its opinion that Congress broadened the scope of preemption in  
22 order to facilitate the operation of regional PDP providers. *Id.* To this end, Congress  
23 recognized that “establishing a uniform set of grievance standards [would] reduce confusion  
24 and burden for enrollees and plans.” 70 Fed. Reg. 4362 (Jan. 28, 2005). The structure and  
25 purpose of the Medicare statutes confirm Congress’s intent to preempt most state law with  
26 federal standards.

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D. Exhaustion of Remedies

Because this Court finds that plaintiffs' claims are preempted for the reasons stated above, the exhaustion of remedies questions raised by the parties are moot.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that:

Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt.# 9-1) is GRANTED in its entirety, and plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

DATED this \_\_5\_\_ day of June, 2006.



RICARDO S. MARTINEZ  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE