



Labor and Employment Developments in President Obama's First 100 Days

The program will begin shortly. The slides and a link to a recording of the webinar will be distributed to attendees after the event.

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Labor and Employment Developments in President Obama's First 100 Days

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Introduction



The Employee Free Choice Act

**“Card Check” -- Changing The
Rules Of The Game**

EFCA – Principal Provisions

- Recognition/Certification Without An Election
- Mandatory “Interest Arbitration” of First Contracts Absent Agreement on Fast-Track Timeline
- New Draconian Penalties Against Employers

Card Check Recognition

- a/k/a “majority sign-up”
- 50% plus 1 of employees in an “appropriate bargaining unit”
- Automatic NLRB certification without an election
- Traditional election petitions still possible, at the union’s choice, but unlikely

First Contract Arbitration

- 120 days to negotiate a contract
- If bargaining unsuccessful after 90 days, mandatory mediation
- And then mandatory “interest” arbitration
- Terms imposed by arbitrators for 2 years

New Penalties Against Employers

- Increased monetary penalties
- Increased availability of injunctive relief against employer campaign activity
- A gag order against employers?

EFCA - Consequences

- Union Organizing – Much Easier
- Collective Bargaining – Less Predictable to the Employer
- Labor Costs – Much Higher

EFCA – Unanswered Questions


- Validity of authorization cards
- Can an employer challenge the proposed bargaining unit
- Use of economic weapons during first contract negotiations
- Mandatory arbitration standards
- Effect on other NLRB rules in organizing campaigns and first contract bargaining

Political Considerations

- Status of EFCA
- The Sestak bill and the “Costco third way”
- Senator Specter’s party affiliation
- Possible Compromise Terms
 - The Canadian “quickie election”
 - Equal access
 - Verification of authorization cards
 - Additional standards for mandatory arbitration
- Will it Pass?

EFCA – What To Do Now

- A Vulnerability Assessment
 - Type and location of facilities
 - Wages/Benefits
 - HR Practices and Procedures
 - Utilization of available HR Diagnostics
- Training
 - Managers
 - Early Warning Signs
 - Legal Constraints
- Employee Communications
 - Timing
 - Content
 - Tone
- Organizational and Operational Considerations



**Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act: Preparing
For Pay
Discrimination
Claims**

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act

- Amends Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act
- Charge timely if filed within 300 days after employee is “affected by” discriminatory pay decision or other practice
- Eviscerates SOL for pay claims; two year limit on back pay
- Retroactive to May 28, 2007

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act


- Immediate Impact – 30-plus decisions applying Ledbetter due to retroactivity provision
 - *Gentry v. Jackson State Univ. (S.D. Miss.)* – 2004 denial-of-tenure claim timely
 - *Gilmore v. Macy’s Retail Holdings (D.N.J.)* – court *sua sponte* revives dismissed claim based on prior promotion decision
 - *Bush v. Orange County Corrections Dept. (M.D. FL)*
– wage claims based on demotion 16 years before complaint filed deemed timely

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act

- Longer-term Impact
 - Significant in class action context
 - Single plaintiff cases more attractive
 - More workplace discussion of pay equity issues

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act

- Proactive Measures
 - Holistic privileged review of compensation practices
 - Focus on all areas of managerial discretion
 - Privileged analyses of pay
 - Base pay analysis
 - “Real-time” analysis of pay change decisions
 - Expand data capture and retention – electronic



**Two Important
Supreme Court
Cases Decided in the
First 100 Days**

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett

129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)

Decided: April 1, 2009

Issue: Whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims under the ADEA is enforceable.

Holding: Yes
(Decision 5:4 with Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting)

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett

129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)

Facts:

- CBA included an antidiscrimination provision requiring that all employees submit employment discrimination claims to binding arbitration.
- After respondents were reassigned by employer, union filed grievance including age discrimination claim.
- Union subsequently withdrew age discrimination claim.
- Respondents filed age discrimination claims in federal district court.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett **129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)**

Procedural History:

- Federal district court denied Petitioners' motion to compel arbitration citing 2nd Circuit precedent in *Rogers v. New York*.
- *Rogers* held that a CBA negotiated by union waiving an individual employee's right to bring a statutory claim in court is unenforceable.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett **129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)**

Supreme Court Reversed and Remanded:

- Arbitration provision enforceable under NLRA.
- Nothing under ADEA precludes arbitration of age discrimination claims.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett **129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)**

Supreme Court addresses tension:

Gardner-Denver Co. held “a collective bargaining agreement could not waive covered workers’ rights to a judicial forum for causes of action created by Congress.”

Gilmer held “an individual employee who had agreed individually to waive his right to a federal forum could be compelled to arbitrate a federal age discrimination claim.”

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett **129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)**

- Supreme Court held *Gilmer* is applicable in context of collective bargaining agreements.
- *Gardner-Denver* should be limited to the unique facts of that case.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett

129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)

Dissenting Opinions:

- (Justice Stevens)
Argues that Court's decision driven by policy favoring arbitration.
- (Justice Souter)
Argues that the Court violated precedent and inappropriately narrowed the Court's holding in *Gardner-Denver*.

Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville **129 S. Ct. 846 (2009)**

Decided: January 26, 2009

Issue: Whether Title VII's anti-retaliation protection extends to "an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer's internal investigation."

Holding: Yes

(Unanimous Decision with Justices Alito and Thomas concurring)

Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville

129 S. Ct. 846 (2009)

Facts:

- Employee participated in school district's investigation of supervisor's alleged sexual misconduct.
- During investigation employee disclosed inappropriate sexual advances made toward her by supervisor.
- Employee subsequently investigated and terminated for meritless reason.

Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville

129 S. Ct. 846 (2009)

U.S. District Court and 6th Circuit held:

- Title VII's anti-retaliation protections did not extend to employee.
- Her cooperation in the internal investigation did not fall within the "opposition" or "participation" clauses of the statute.

Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville **129 S. Ct. 846 (2009)**

Supreme Court Reversed and Remanded:


- Term “Oppose” carries its ordinary meaning.
- Term “Oppose” does not require “active, consistent” activity or initiation of complaint.
- An employee can “oppose” discriminatory behavior by responding to someone else’s question.

Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville **129 S. Ct. 846 (2009)**

- Court rejected amici arguments that not requiring “active, consistent” activity would discourage employers from raising questions about discrimination.
- Court did not reach “participation” clause issue.

Concurring opinion (Justice Alito)

- Definition of “oppose” should require “active” and “purposive” conduct.
- Warns against creation of a definition that would protect “silent opposition” or opposition that was never communicated to employer.



**TWO OTHER
IMPORTANT CASES
PENDING BEFORE
THE SUPREME
COURT**

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.

526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008)

Issue:

Whether in a “mixed motives” case an employee in an age discrimination trial must present direct evidence that discrimination occurred, in order to obtain a jury instruction that places the burden of proof on the employer.

Case Argued:

Before Supreme Court on March 31, 2009.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.

526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008)

Facts:

- Employee sued employer alleging age discrimination following a series of demotions.
- Employer asserted “mixed motives” defense. Employee presented no direct evidence that age was motivating factor.

Jury Instruction:

- Verdict must be for employer “if [*employer*] *has proved* by a preponderance of evidence that [employee] would have been demoted regardless of his age.”

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.

526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008)

Eighth Circuit holding:

- Jury instruction was improper.
- To obtain an instruction that places burden of proof on employer, employee must produce direct evidence that age was the motivating factor.
- If no direct evidence of discrimination, then burden remains, at all times, on employee.
- The 1991 Amendments to Title VII (which place burden of proof on employees in mixed motive cases) do not apply to ADEA cases.
- *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins* applies to ADEA cases.

Ricci v. John Destefano

**554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.Conn. 2006),
affirmed 264 Fed. App. 106 (2d Cir. 2008)**

Issue: Whether a city may lawfully refuse to certify test results that would disproportionately make more white applicants eligible for promotions.

Case argued: Before Supreme Court on April 22, 2009.

Ricci v. John Destefano

**554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.Conn. 2006),
affirmed 264 Fed. App. 106 (2d Cir. 2008)**

Facts:

- City Fire Department administered oral and written tests for promotion to Lieutenant and Captain.
- “Rule of Three” required promotions to be filled by one of the top three test scorers.
- City refused to certify test scores because test results revealed disparate impact against African-Americans and Hispanics.
- City asserted desire to comply with Title VII’s anti-disparate impact requirements as basis for refusal.

Ricci v. John Destefano

**554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.Conn. 2006),
affirmed 264 Fed. App. 106 (2d Cir. 2008)**

Procedural History:

- Class of White (and one Hispanic) employees brought suit alleging disparate treatment under Title VII and violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
- Alleged that African-Americans and Hispanics received race-based preferential treatment.
- Parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on Title VII and Equal Protection claims.

Ricci v. John Destefano

**554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.Conn. 2006),
affirmed 264 Fed. App. 106 (2d Cir. 2008)**

Plaintiffs' Title VII Argument:

- City's alleged desire to comply with Title VII's anti-disparate impact requirement was a pretext for intentional discrimination against white candidates.

Ricci v. John Destefano

**554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.Conn. 2006),
affirmed 264 Fed. App. 106 (2d Cir. 2008)**

Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Argument:

- City's refusal to certify exam results amounted to a race-based classification system for promotion.
- Alternatively, the City applied facially neutrally promotion criteria in a discriminatory manner.

Ricci v. John Destefano

**554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.Conn. 2006),
affirmed 264 Fed. App. 106 (2d Cir. 2008)**

Lower Courts Rejected Title VII Arguments:

- The failure of the test results to satisfy EEOC's "4/5 Rule" demonstrates that disparate impact was statistically significant.
- Title VII does not require the City to obtain a validation study or demonstrate that there were less discriminatory alternatives available.

Ricci v. John Destefano

**554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.Conn. 2006),
affirmed 264 Fed. App. 106 (2d Cir. 2008)**

Lower Courts Rejected Plaintiff's Equal Protection Arguments:

- No equal protection violation because everyone was treated the same. The exam was administered and score identically, and nobody was promoted.
- Plaintiffs had no “entitlement” to promotion.
- No evidence of discriminatory purpose.



American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 – COBRA Premium Subsidy

**BENEFIT FOR EMPLOYEES
BURDEN FOR EMPLOYERS**

COBRA SUBSIDY – THE BASICS

- Who’s Covered – “Assistance Eligible Individual” (“AEI”)
 - Any COBRA “Qualified Beneficiary”
 - “Involuntary Termination” of Employment from 9/1/08 – 12/31/09
 - IRS Guidance regarding Reduction in Hours
 - Resulting in Loss of Group Health Coverage
 - Employer Structuring Options
 - Income Limitations
 - Open Question – Need for Pre-Qualification

COBRA SUBSIDY – THE BASICS (cont'd)

- What's the Benefit?
 - 35%/65% Split of COBRA Premium
 - AEI pays 35%
 - Treated as payment in full of COBRA premium
 - Payment by third party other than the Employer
 - 65% is the responsibility of “the person to whom premiums are payable under COBRA continuation coverage”
 - Reimbursement through credit against income tax withholding for that person's own employees

COBRA SUBSIDY – ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

- Who Pays the 65%?
 - Only “the person to whom premiums are payable” can pay and receive reimbursement for the 65%
 - Multi-employer plans – the plan (no IRS guidance)
 - Self-Insured Plans Subject to COBRA – Employer
 - Insured Plans Subject to COBRA – Employer
 - The “Direct Pay” Problem
 - Plans Subject to Comparable State Law – Insurer
 - The Problem of “Comparable Coverage”

COBRA SUBSIDY – ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (cont'd)

- DOL Models -- the Need for “Complete Notice”
 - Model General Notice (Full Version)
 - Complete Package of Forms
 - Model General Notice (Abbreviated Version) – All AEIs who already elected COBRA
 - Model Notice of Extended Election Periods – Potential AEIs Who Refused or Canceled COBRA
 - Model Alternative Notice – Insurers under State Programs
 - <http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/COBRAmodelnotice.html>

COBRA SUBSIDY – TRAPS FOR THE UNWARY

- (1) Payment by AEI guarantees coverage
 - Importance of Contractual Relationship with Insurer
 - Difficulties in the “Direct Pay” Structure
- (2) Involuntary Termination – Limitations
 - IRS Notice 2009-27, Q&A 1-9
- (3) “Complete Notice” Requirement
 - Potential for reopening previously closed COBRA election periods

COBRA SUBSIDY – TRAPS FOR THE UNWARY (cont'd)

- The Severance Package Problem
 - Employer Extension of Coverage
 - Employer Payment of COBRA Premiums
- Eligibility Determinations
 - IRS Notice 2007, Q&A 45 – No refusal even if employer knows the income limit is exceeded
 - Conflict with DOL eligibility form
- Applying for Reimbursement – Offset or Repayment

COBRA SUBSIDY – TRAPS FOR THE UNWARY

- Potential Multiple Notice Requirements
 - Special rules for involuntary terminations in January and February 2009
- The State “Comparable Coverage” Conundrum
 - HHS -the need for state insurance commissioner action

COBRA SUBSIDY – EVOLVING STRATEGIES

- Coordination between Employers and Insurers
 - Potential Need for Contract Restructuring
- Use of the “Cover Letter”
 - Need to avoid employee confusion
- Importance of Recordkeeping
 - An IRS/DOL audit program is inevitable
 - Avoid potential excise taxes and civil penalties



The Obama Administration Takes Action

The Power of the Executive Order

Executive Order #13502

- “Use of Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction Projects”
 - Announces a government policy of encouraging use of PLAs on large-scale construction projects for the “efficient and expeditious completion” of projects funded by the federal government
 - Broad discretion to executive agencies to require PLAs on construction projects
 - Agencies can require all contractors and subcontractors to be signatory to PLA

Executive Order #13496

- “Notification of Employee Rights under Federal Labor Law”
 - Revokes E.O. 13201 requiring posting of “Beck” notice at job sites covered by government contracts
 - New notice, to be promulgated by DOL to be posted at all job sites; notice must affirmatively advise employees of the right to organize
 - Contractor must comply with “all provisions of the . . . Notice, and related rules, regulations and orders”
 - Applies to almost all government contracts

Executive Order #13495

- “Non-displacement of Qualified Workers under Service Contracts”
 - Successful bidders on “follow-on” service contracts must offer a right of first refusal to employees of predecessor contractor “in positions for which they are qualified.”
 - Managers and supervisors excluded

Executive Order #13495

- Exception where new contractor has reasonable belief, based on employees' past performance, that they have "failed to perform suitably on the job."
- Applies to almost all contracts awarded under the Service Contract Act
- Effectively negates the successful bidder's ability to hire a new workforce thus guaranteeing labor law successorship
- Does not require new employer to assume predecessor's collective bargaining agreement

Executive Order #13494

- “Economy in Government Contracting”
 - Order changes settled “cost principles” to preclude an employer from charging the government for costs incurred as part of union organizing campaigns
 - Costs “undertaken to persuade employees . . . to exercise or not to exercise. . . the right to organize and bargain collectively” are unallowable
 - Applies to almost all government contracts

Executive Order #13494

- Examples of unallowable costs:
 - preparing and distributing campaign materials;
 - hiring or consulting legal counsel or consultants;
 - holding meetings (including paying the salaries of the attendees at meetings held for this purpose);
 - Planning or conducting campaign activities by managers, supervisors or union representatives during work hours

Executive Order #13494

- Order permits costs incurred in “maintaining satisfactory relations between the contractor and its employees, including costs of labor-management committees” to be treated as allowable costs

Q&A

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