

**ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH:  
MESSENGER MODELS ASTRAY  
AND WHAT ELSE IS NEW**

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- Prohibits
  - agreements in restraint of trade
  - Monopolization
- Enforced by
  - Department of Justice
  - FTC
  - States
  - Private plaintiffs

# FTC-DOJ Report -- Critical messages

- #1 Value-based purchasing promotes a competitive marketplace
- #2 The public should be provided with more information on prices and quality
- #3 Barriers to entry in provider markets should be decreased
- #4 Mandates (including provider mandates) are anti-competitive
- #5 Providers are subject to the antitrust laws –just like everyone else
- #6 Agencies will scrutinize mergers and alleged abusive conduct by payors

- Agreement – takes two
- Price fixing and group boycotts
- Exception for bona fide joint ventures – “rule of reason”
- Network avoids joint agreement on price – “messenger model”

- Collusion in reimbursement to providers
- Collusion/customer allocation/bid rigging of customer accounts

# Making monopoly


- Unfairly excluding competitors or using market power to prevent customers from benefiting from competition
- Not illegal for monopolist to simply charge high prices

- Annual dinner meeting
- President's address
- “Costs up; my fees going up to 7%”



- No price fixing -- competitors cannot agree on fees or price terms
  - Price fixing includes agreements on any element of price equation, not just agreement on actual prices
- No group boycotts -- Joint refusals to deal or threats over fees illegal
- Watch out for:
  - “I don't know about you, but I am ...”
  - “Let's all ‘unilaterally’ refuse to ....”
  - “So long as it's not in the minutes, it's OK”.
  - “So long as it's in the minutes, it's OK.”
  - “OK, counsel told us the rules, now let's move on to business [and set prices] . . .”
- Other joint action can be unlawful depending on the specific facts
  - Bona fide joint ventures – “rule of reason”
  - Price fixing cartel is not a joint venture – a budget doesn't make it “legit”

- “Take it or leave it” deals offered by plans
- Few plans enroll high percentage of patients
- Information and leverage gap
- Desire to “level the playing field”



“Health care providers who must deal with consumers . . . through [managed care] plans . . . face an unusual situation that may legitimate certain collective actions. . . . In light of [the] departures from a normal competitive market, . . . health care providers are entitled to . . . take some joint action [. . .]

## Feel the tension (2)

*(short of price fixing or a group boycott)* to level the bargaining imbalance . . . . Providers might . . . band together to negotiate [non-price points] . . . such as payment procedures, the type of documentation they must provide, the method of referring patients and the mechanism for adjusting disputes. Such concerted actions . . . must be carefully distinguished from efforts to dictate terms by explicit or implicit threats of mass withdrawals . . . .

*United States v. Alston* (9th Cir. 1992).



- Providers can join together to enhance quality and clinical outcome improvement or be accountable for cost of care
- Joint network contracting may be appropriate where key to success of positive venture;
- Opportunity for brand or product differentiation by interested payor

- Price negotiation not automatically illegal where providers share together in responsibility for cost or utilization or have significant upside gain potential for staying within realistic budget
- Still illegal if “united front” of too many providers
- Wrong question -- How much “risk sharing” to be able to fix prices?

- “Per se” price fixing law may not apply if providers are clinically integrated
- Examples -- practice protocols adopted and followed, sharing of clinical information, shared electronic medical records or health risk assessment protocols, oversight, accountability and reporting of performance – slimmed down program not enough
- AND joint price setting must be reasonably necessary to make venture work
  - Are physicians devoting significant time or capital to programs and planning?
  - Would they do so if there was no assurance that network would be contracting as one?
  - Will negotiated fee schedule be adapted to incentivize participation and compliance by physicians in key specialties, central to quality improvement?
- Still subject to “rule of reason” analysis

- Combination of risk contract and clinical integration
- Risk element converted to rewards for meeting quality improvement, outcome or clinical integration objectives
- Is price fixing necessary to make pay for performance arrangement work?
- How material are incentives and clinical improvement activity compared to price fixing component?

- IPAs and PPOs can develop “model” contracts or contract language
  - Contracts may illustrate sample provisions and offer choices
  - Frequently seen contract terms can be explained
  - Areas for physician focus may be noted
  - Should not be directive or “hidden message” sent
- Do say “Here is language to consider” or “Note the impact of this provision”
- Do not say “Don’t sign these” or “Use only this language”.
- Must be educational; not centerpiece of boycott campaign
- Avoid price – danger that “suggested” price terms will be viewed as “agreement” on price terms.

# Surveys, information sharing and education


- Physicians can share historical information on fees, shielding identification and using data at least 3 months old
- Fee information can be collected via survey and conveyed to payors
- May convey information to providers to help make them informed marketplace decision-makers, without “call to arms”
- Education  $\neq$  coercion

- Provider network negotiates non-price components of managed care contract
- Acts as “messenger” for price terms, not as cartel
  - May use “drop box” or “clearinghouse” model
  - Creates clearinghouse with lock-in
  - Individual physicians indicate prices they would accept
  - Network can likely decline contracts that do not generate widespread physician participation
  - May include annual screen against physician’s fee specifications
- Must avoid “sham” messenger model arrangements
  - There’s lots of them. Led to lots of FTC cases.
- Safety zone applies if 30% or less of specialty in network; 20% if doctors are “exclusive”

- Does “messenger model” work? Depends what you mean by “work”.
  - Give physician better information to act on? -- OK
  - Give physician vehicle for carrying out market-based decisions? -- OK
  - Give physician automatic re-check of contract terms against acceptable fee parameters – OK
  - Go back to 1975 – not OK

## Enforcement is active

Some providers go too far. Repeated enforcement by FTC and DOJ – They're trying tougher remedies. Suing organizations, doctors AND CONSULTANTS.



- Competing groups employ same consultant who coordinates contracting, and acts as “hub” of price fixing understanding
- Providers collectively obstruct “pay for performance” or other programs basing compensation on quality measures
- Association of physicians claims to be “messenger” only, but actually coordinates price fixing scheme

## Common problems (2)

- Hospitals or doctors try to justify price fixing by unsupported claims they are “clinically integrated”
- PHO operates as joint venture accepting limited risk for enrollee costs, but has most area providers tied up under de facto exclusive contracts, and threatens boycott to force higher rates
- Key hospital agrees that it will only do managed care contracts through PHO that demands above market rates for physician services.
- Messenger model IPA or PHO won’t “messenger” arrangements that don’t pay high enough prices and tells members what the floor is.

# Contracting Practices of Powerful Systems

- Powerful provider system uses “must have status” -- from size, availability of specialty services or products, or location -- to force contract concessions by health plans using bundling, tie-ins, forced exclusivity, or suppression of choices creating cost transparency.
- This may be legal, but the provider system may be crossing an antitrust line, depending on the facts.
- How does conduct affect competition? Legitimate efficiency justification?

- “All or none” contracting
  - Forced inclusion of higher priced or lower quality hospitals, ancillary providers, or physicians
- No discounts at any facility if “tiering” against any provider in system
- Ban on “consumer directed” plan designs that include greater transparency in cost to consumer
- Hospital system requires health plan to prevent MD steering incentives to other hospitals
- Hospital conditions discounts on exclusion of competing new ASC

- Exclusive contract at hospital –
  - May not be unlawful
- Pressure on hospital not to permit competition
- Mergers to lock up specialty at multiple hospitals in local market

## Other enforcement developments to watch

- “Retrospective” hospital merger case in Illinois
- Clinical cooperation as purported basis for price fixing”
- All or none” and other “bossy” contracting by dominant hospital systems
- Exclusionary conduct by hospital-based physicians
- Payor misbehavior -- e.g., conspiring re provider rates, MFNs by dominant plans, or anticompetitive mergers
- Messenger models “at the edge”
- Product market allocations by hospitals, particularly in conjunction with CON laws

- Doctors in a single group practice cannot “conspire” with themselves in violation of the antitrust laws
- Combination of doctors into a group is legal unless it would provide market power
- Combination in a “sham” group can result in price fixing charges

- Normally, a “promise to give me your best deal” requirement is not illegal
- Department of Justice has sued dominant health insurers where the impact is to stifle competition from smaller plans, and set floor on fees.
- MFN adopted by physician network on its members’ dealings with plans is very risky.
- Some state insurance law bar them